As Wu argues, however, it gives novel evidence for a claim that has often been difficult to underwrite: that marginalized groups might be epistemically superior in certain respects (the “inversion thesis”). Wu’s paper provides a clear proof-of-possibility of this claim. Like any mathematical or simulation model, it makes idealizations that are better or worse approximations of different parts of real social systems. In order to fully understand the applicability of the results to a specific social system, one might want to dig into these. Wu’s proposed mechanism applies to some, but not all, cases of injustice.
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Critical to Wu’s model is that this is a one-sided break in the epistemic network. Marginalized groups can receive evidence from the dominant group. So they have access to a public good that the dominant group does not. But since the dominant group ignores the marginalized, they forgo the public good.
Modeling Injustice in Epistemic Networks
Jingyi Wu
Critical to Wu’s model is that this is a one-sided break in the epistemic network. Marginalized groups can receive evidence from the dominant group. So they have access to a public good that the dominant group does not. But since the dominant group ignores the marginalized, they forgo the public good.
Commentary
Kevin Zollman
This is a hypothetical scenario, of course, but I’m sure many of you recognize the pattern (it even has a name—hepeating). It is empirically well-documented that testimony given by socially marginalized people is often devalued by people in dominant groups. Law professor Meera Deo conducted a meticulous study about the role of race and gender in the academic context, and found that most women in the study sample, “regardless of racial/ ethnic background, have endured silencing, harassment, mansplaining, hepeating, and gender bias” (Deo 2019, 47). One study subject counted over ten times that she was hepeated in faculty meetings. Similarly, studies have also found that people of color’s testimony in the court system is taken to carry less weight (Carlin 2016).
This is a hypothetical scenario, of course, but I’m sure many of you recognize the pattern (it even has a name—hepeating). It is empirically well-documented that testimony given by socially marginalized people is often devalued by people in dominant groups. Law professor Meera Deo conducted a meticulous study about the role of race and gender in the academic context, and found that most women in the study sample, “regardless of racial/ ethnic background, have endured silencing, harassment, mansplaining, hepeating, and gender bias” (Deo 2019, 47). One study subject counted over ten times that she was hepeated in faculty meetings. Similarly, studies have also found that people of color’s testimony in the court system is taken to carry less weight (Carlin 2016).
Welcome to the Brains Blog’s Symposium series on the Cognitive Science of Philosophy. The aim of the series is to examine the use of diverse methods to generate philosophical insight. Each symposium is comprised of two parts. In the target post, a practitioner describes their use of the method under discussion and explains why they find it philosophically fruitful. A commentator then responds to the target post and discusses the strengths and limitations of the method.
